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Crisis of Transatlantic Relations:
NATO and the Future European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI)
Mamedov Muschwig*
Translated by Carmen Klein
I. Introduction
The 20th Century has been one of the bloodiest in history,
because we have failed again and again to prevent conflicts. The Munich
Convention of 1938 was presumably one of the most humiliating
examples of this incapacity. In recent times, probably the civil war in
Former Yugoslavia has been a further illustration of the failure of a
diplomacy of deterrence. Further bloodshed was prevented only by a fast
intervention of NATO.1
It is fair to say that the 20th Century began on the day that
Gavrilo Princip murdered the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand in
Sarajevo and thereby triggered the beginning of the First World War. It
is one of the great ironies of history that at the end of the same century in
the same city the same nationalistic passions unleashed and caused the
death of thousands of Bosnians who had been suffering already for a
long time.
However, there has also been a spectacular example of
successful conflict prevention: the Cold War. Due to the equilibrium of
terror, due to the reliability and credibility of NATO deterrence and due
to the existence of nuclear weapons, East and West threateningly faced
each other only for half a century. The Superpowers terminated their
confrontation after the collapse of communism and the desegregation of
the Soviet Union-without the use of a single bullet.
One decade after the Wall's fall, the overall concept of the Cold
War, the bipolarity of East and West, has not yet vanished from the
transatlantic relations between Europe and the U.S. On one hand the past
continues to have an effect on NATO's extension to the East, in
particular with regard to the new members' motives for joining NATO.
* (J.D.) University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany.
1 See M. Eyskens, Konfliktverhinderung und europiiische Verteidigung -Wie
kann Europa Konflikte verhindern? The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy
Research, Nov. 1997.
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On the other hand, the past is but a memory as Russia is a member of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Being the most important
institutional transatlantic pillar, NATO finds itself in an ambivalent
situation: On the one hand it allies itself with the former satellites of the
former Soviet Union, on the other hand it yields to Russia's vehement
courting by gradually integrating Russia into the structure of the North
Atlantic Alliance.
However, the war in Chechnya imposed a burden on the
relations between Russia and the Western Allies. NATO and the
European Union continued their practical cooperation with Russia to a
large extent and limited themselves to the verbal condemnation of the
warfare as well as to the demand to search for a peaceful solution of the
conflict.
With regard to transatlantic relations, the Europeans were
particularly concerned about the American plans of a National Missile
Defense (NMD). Whereas the Americans reassured to make the decision
on the missile defense system contingent on its feasibility and the costs
as well as on its alliance and arms control compatibility.
Presently, transatlantic relations are experiencing a renaissance,
since-in light of the severe economic and financial crisis in Eastern
Asia and Russia-Europe stands as America's only sturdy economic and
trade partner. America and Europe also depend on each other with
respect to security policies. The Europeans could accomplish the military
pacification of former Yugoslavia only in cooperation with the
Americans. In addition, the war in Kosovo demonstrated again that
Europe is only capable of limited action with regard to its foreign and
security policies and that it is far from steadily speaking with one voice
or even acting uniformly. Furthermore, Europe and America work on a
large transatlantic economic trade area. By use of the common currency,
the European Union will become an even more attractive partner-and
simultaneously a stronger competitor-for the Americans. The prospect of
extension to the east and the hope for Russia's economic and democratic
development unify the Europeans and the Americans in their goals
relating to Europe and their foreign policy.
From the British-French Summit in Saint-Malo and the Cologne
and Helsind European Councils to the Feira European Council, an
extremely positive and historically important development occurred with
regard to the stabilization of the Common European Security and
Defense Policy (CESDP). This development was sustained by the broad
consent between the Member States to finally draw practical conclusions
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with respect to the security political dimension of the European
integration after decades of defense policy abstinence.
2
My note scrutinizes the problems with reference to this subject.
In the first section, I try to describe the prerequisites of a European
Security and Defense Policy and I address the processes in the Balkans.
In the second section, I try to illustrate the development of the ESDI with
respect to the European Nice Council. In the third section, I discuss
developments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after
Nice.
II. Necessity for the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI)
In former times it was called "burden sharing", today it is called
"European Security and Defense Identity" (ESDI). The principle issue is
adjusting the predominance of the United States in the area of military
co-operation. There commences a hectic drive: No conference passes off
without resolutions in favor of the stabilization of European defense. The
deficits are specified more candidly than ever before: Strategic
intelligence, strategic transportability and leadership skills are the three
main objectives; numerous smaller ones could be added. At the same
time the instruments are sharpened, new EU committees are created and
the integration of the WEU and the European Union is considered.
One should not fool himself: Instruments that could enable a
purely European action are actually already sufficiently in existence.
What is missing is the equipment within the specified areas. However,
equipment is expensive. In 1999, the NATO Secretaries of Defense
stated in their autumn conference communiqu6 that the rise of the gross
national product in the alliance's member states does not result in an
according increase of the defense budgets. This communiqu6 was
composed for each secretary's business practice rather than for NATO's
practice. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson put it this way:
The security political prerequisites have to be formulated in such a way
that the Ministers of Finance understand them. It is certainly correct to
vividly pursue for the first time the approach to spend the money
available in such an intelligent way as to obtain as much security in
return as possible. This includes that material is procured in international
cooperation to a larger extent than the past, as aspired in the case of the
2 See M. Jopp, Gemeinsame Europiaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,
Jahrbuch der Europaischen Integration 243 (1999/2000).
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new transport aircraft. As a positive side effect this could lead to the
development of joint task forces such as a European transport command.
On the long-term basis, a European army could emerge from these
forces, a second column after the Euro representing the vision of a
European Federal State.3
A. Historical Continuities: The Role of the
United States in Europe
Until the entry of the United States into World War I, European-
American relations were characterized by bilateral relations between the
U.S. and respective European states. Only toward the end of the 19th
Century did the Americans begin to focus more on Europe.
During the First World War, the United States appeared for the
first time as a European order-keeping power. The United States
unassertively entered the war against Germany only as an "associate"
power, not as an ally of Germany's war opponents. The participation of
the Americans in the Second World War, however, was of a different
quality. Without the U.S. involvement, the European continent could not
have been relieved. After the war, the U.S. became the leading power of
the West. Due to its economic and military potential as well as its
economic interests and the precarious security situation in light of
expansionistic efforts of the Soviet Union, the U.S. dominated
transatlantic relations until the end of the Cold War.
A Europe that represents common interests to the outward world
exists only since 1945 and since the beginning of the Cold War. After the
end of the Second World War it quickly became clear that-in the face
of the expansive and aggressive foreign policy of the Kremlin-
Americans and Europeans could not drop back again into isolationist
action patterns governed by competition amongst themselves. Yet the
history of wars and disputes even before the First World War had already
contributed to a consciousness of the need for a cooperative and peaceful
organization and for a structural arrangement of the different national
interests in Europe. In the years after 1945, the United States pushed for
Western European integration, which thereby almost became a condition
for the assistance provided by the Marshall Plan.4
3 See C. Rolf, Europdische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentitat, Kommentar
2000,
available at <http://www.soldat-und-technik.de/kommentar000l.htm>.
4 See Ash & Garton, Europe's Endangered Liberal Order, 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
54 (1998).
VOL. 10
NATO AND ESDI
The American Foreign and European Policies were by far not
only reactive, but conceived as a response to the threat to the western
interests by the communist states in the world. The strategic adjustment
of economic and military resources in the international area of conflict
caused by the Cold War was also based on a dominant economic-
political-ideological component. For Dean Acheson, George Marshall
and other American foreign policy protagonists and planners, the
establishment of a liberal market system represented an important
objective of strategic postwar planning, whereas the efforts for entering
the European markets resulted from this headline goal, which crucially
determined the relation to the European unification efforts since 1945. 5
Only as a result of the role of the superpower, America, as the
benevolent hegemon in Europe and by suspending the need for the
European states to respectively influence economic advantages and
military balance of power among themselves for their own benefit,
economic revival, institutional and political integration and peace in
Western Europe could be secured.6 The entire American post Second-
World-War policy towards the Soviet Union-from containment to
ddtente-stood in the general context of aiming at the establishment of a
liberal international economic system. Additionally, the security policy
towards the Warsaw Pact had also a function relating to domestic affairs,
namely to legitimize the financial and military resources necessary for
the super-ordinate target of a liberal international economic system
before Congress and the public.
During the process of European integration, the Americans
occasionally evinced ambivalent attitudes toward the establishment of a
potential competitor in trade and international economy. At large,
however, America supported the economic and political integration of
Europe. The core of the European integration project was and is the
historical reconciliation between France and Germany. From the Coal
and Steel Community to the last preliminary stage, the entry into force of
the Monetary Union on January 1, 1999, the development of European
integration has always also contained an aspect of the political
integration of Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall in the year 1989
made it very quickly apparent that a comprehensive political, cultural
and national security-oriented reorganization would have to take place on
the European continent.
5 See B.C. Schwarz, "Cold War" Continuities: US Economics and Security
Strategy Towards Europe 82-104 (Ted Galen Ed., London 1995).6 See B. C. Schwarz at 86.
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Germany, its European partners and allies, and the Americans
were aware of the fact that a reunification of the two German states could
only be achieved with the cooperation of all parties directly involved and
concerned as well as of the German partners. America played the central
role in the diplomatic activities and negotiations concerning the German
unification in the year 1990. In closest cooperation with Germany, the
USA merged England and France into the process, calmed down Eastern
neighboring countries such as Poland, and induced the Soviet Union by a
diplomatic masterstroke to agree to the German unification and to the
comprehensive retreat from Germany.
In light of the dramatic political changes in Europe, the EEC and
the USA adopted the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990. This document
provided for regular consultations on all political levels as well as for bi-
annual meetings among the American President, the Commission and the
President of the European Council. The Transatlantic Declaration
thereby caused an intensification of communication and a mutual
insurance of common political values and objectives. It lacked, however,
an important goal of many protagonists who wanted to see the
transatlantic relations supported by common efforts and actions of
practical policy. This weak point soon became obvious. Additionally,
since the beginning of the nineties, the awareness that the pending world-
political developments and global economic modifications would still
require a closer and more intensive cooperation grew on both sides of the
Atlantic. The first result of this recognition was the adoption of the New
Transatlantic Agenda in Madrid in December 1995. Thus, a new
qualitative phase of transatlantic cooperation was initiated, which in the
view of the Europeans-and particularly supported by Germany-should
result in a transatlantic free trade area (TAFTA). Europeans believe that
TAFTA, in connection with a close coordination of concerns and
contents of EU and U.S. foreign policy, is the politically necessary
concretion of the transatlantic partnership for the diffusion of future
problems.
B. Europe - Economic Heavyweight, Political
Lightweight?
The initiation of this process will enable the European Union to
take full responsibility for the entire spectrum of tasks of conflict
prevention and crisis management. Why is this so important? During the
last forty years the European Union became one of the world's most
7 See W. Weidenfeld, Kulturbruch mit Amerika? Das Ende transatlantischer
Selbstverstidndlichkeit (Giitersloh 1996).
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challenging, most complex and most progressive examples of regional
integration. The European Union is now the largest trading block of the
world and one of the most important protagonists within the full
spectrum of global, financial and economic aspects.8
Globalization and increasing interdependence signify that the
rest of the world can no longer be viewed exclusively from the
perspective of economic objectives. Globalization has brought about a
whole number of transnational challenges, of which many were
completely unknown a generation ago. The dangers of terrorism,
international drug trafficking, money laundering, the spread of AIDS: all
this confronts the European Union Member States with new "globalized"
problems and new responsibilities. The tough development of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the Treaty of
Maastricht has only provided limited means as responses to these
challenges.
But a CFSP without tools is an empty shell. The European Union
successfully uses its economic importance for the support of its political
goals. It does this in the context of WTO negotiations, in supporting
economic reconstruction or as a worldwide leader of development policy.
One objection to the EU approach is that these economical instruments
can still be further developed and more efficiently furnished; however,
they nevertheless represent without doubt a strong point of the EU
policies. What the European Union needs to do in order to assert its
influence in the world is to supplement these instruments by adding a
security capacity. With regard to the extension of the Union and in light
of the new challenges of the next century, the European Union has to
adjust to taking more responsibility for regional security. This applies in
particular to the adjacent regions in which the Union is directly
interested.
How to explain the European Union's reluctance to take on a
larger role in world politics, one that corresponds to its global
importance? Why did the European Union fail so often during
international crises? Why has the Common Foreign and Security Policy
of the Union been criticized in the press as well as in scientific literature
as representing a system of "procedure as policy surrogate?" How can it
be that the Treaty of Maastricht so clearly defines the targets of the CFSP
and yet it remains so unclear on how these goals should be reached? The
simple response is that the requisite political will for the relevant steps is
missing. Difficulties abound in attempting to put together a coherent
8 See . Solana, Die GESVP- Das Integrationsprojekt der ndichsten Dekade,
INTEGRATION 2 (1/2000).
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European Foreign Policy for fifteen Member States, each with different
traditions and interests with regard to foreign policy.
Obviously, the Member States have common interests, which
should also be jointly defended. Those interests do not only consist of the
increase of the European gross domestic product, but also exist on a
political level. In this area, the European Union has a common obligation
to promote the proliferation of universally effective human rights,
freedom and democracy. These are values which appeared to have
almost been lost in the first half of this century, but whose vitality,
however, remained unbroken in the second half of the 20th century. The
implementation of these rights has contributed to the lasting success of
the European Union.9
Whenever necessary, the European Union must be prepared to
use all legitimate means in -order to project security and stability beyond
its boundaries. In addition, the European Union has to be capable of
representing the values of humanitarian solidarity and compliance with
human rights where the life of entire peoples depends on auxiliary
efforts, because they have been victimized by natural disasters or crises
caused by human beings.'0
The fragmentation of decision-making processes with regard to
foreign policy, both within Member States and among international
institutions is virtually a prescription for lack of coherence. The solution
to this problem is to begin efforts toward a joint strategy; the goal is a
long-term concept. This is one way by which the influence and collective
power of the EU can be mobilized in the name of common values. This
does not mean that Member States should not have their national
interests in mind, but that common interests can often better be realized
by joint efforts.
Compliance with human rights, also in the relations among
states, will curb excessive nationalistic tendencies. Since the French
Revolution, citizens who have lived in a constitutional state have not
taken the law into their own hands. Instead, the defense of citizens'
legitimate interests is guaranteed by the existence of a cohesive legal
procedure. A similar development becomes visible in the relations
among states, where multilateral diplomatic and legal mechanisms
gradually replace the right of the individual state to use coercive force to
implement its rights.
9 See C. Patten, Die Zukunft der ESVP und die Rolle der Europaiischen
Kommission, INTEGRATION 8 (1/2000).10See J. Solana at 2.
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Past experience contradicts the notion of a community of
sovereign states where everyone has the individual right to defend his
legitimate national interests within multilateral mechanisms like the UN.
Instead, it appears there is .a trend pointing towards a powerful interna-
tional community. This development, however, depends on the
organization of the community. Here, the future role of the United
Nations is of special interest: the creation of international courts which
can effectively punish crimes against humanity, the establishment of a
system of preventive diplomacy and the implementation of striking
sanctions against countries that have violated human rights show a
development policy and a democratization of the political structures.
Currently, the question of the striking power of UN missions
leads to some particularly thorny problems. UN members finance large
multilateral peace missions only reluctantly. Above all, the peacemaking
missions of the international community are highly controversial,
particularly if human lives are at stake. The notion of a right to
humanitarian intervention, even of an obligation of such intervention, has
become widely accepted worldwide, not only as a theoretical principle,
but as a basis for actual local operations such as in Bosnia, Rwanda, East
Timor and Somalia. However, in this area, there is still much to be done,
as evidenced by the tragedies in Bosnia, Kambodscha and Rwanda.
In order to avoid such events in the future, the international
community has made an effort to decipher its operational potential and
the effect thereof. So far, the European Union's appearance in the world
arena has been characterized by a lack of striking power, coherence and
reputation. As such, Europe may be characterized as an economic giant,
a political dwarf and a military worm. Not once has the European Union
succeeded in attaining the status of a superpower-not in the Near East
or in Africa, nor in Former Yugoslavia, and not even in Cyprus. In all
these cases, Europe was helplessly stranded."
C. The Lessons Learned from the Balkans
The European Union has much to contribute to the avoidance
and termination of conflicts. It has the power and the influence, and-
due to the UN Charter-the Union has the necessary action framework at
its disposal. If the EU wants to do more than it has so far, then it needs a
military division whose function would be the resolution of conflicts
outside of the community. This institution would ultimately vest the EU
with the necessary military power, if, in the case of a state of emergency,
the United States in an exceptional event denied NATO permission to
" See M. Eyskens at 27.
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act. The closer a conflict occurs to the boundaries of the EU, the higher
are the chances of an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP).
Of crucial importance for such a CFSP is a mechanism that
creates consensus, provides for procedures to converge the different
opinions of the individual Member States and which ultimately permits
the 15, or soon 20, independent nations to articulate themselves as a unit
and take action accordingly. In light of the contradictory opinions within
most international organizations, a hard core of relatively wealthy
nations would represent an inestimable advantage for effective decision
making. In addition, they would signify a serious counterweight in
relation to the otherwise undoubtedly dominant position of the United
States.
Much of what the EU has already achieved in the field of foreign
policy is undermined by the constant complaints of some Members.
Those critics desire the United States of Europe with their own Minister
of Foreign Affairs, who would only be responsible to its directly elected
president or prime minister. Therefore, a minority of those who would
like to enforce such an integrated model of European unification seems
to also have an interest in discrediting the achievements of the European
Union and in repeatedly pointing to failures in the past and in the present.
This negative propaganda becomes nowhere more obvious than in the
devaluation of the European Union's missions in the Balkans and in the
praise for the role of the Americans, whose failure was just as serious as
ours.
The fact is, however, that the contribution of EU members to
conflict prevention in the Balkans-mainly by way of development of
the CFSP-is without real alternative. In the face of the human lives
which were sacrificed in the service of the UN, in light of the number of
soldiers in the UN and NATO armed forces, the costs of humanitarian
aid or negotiations and the use of resources, the European Union
undertook huge, lasting efforts. If the European Union regrets not being
able to successfully restore peace in Former Yugoslavia as the United
States of Europe, then it queries its own history and geography: In two
World Wars, large EU Member States faced each other in the Balkans.
Against this backdrop, sending their own troops into the crisis area was
still considered "inappropriate" for Germany and Italy between 1991 and
1994.
The fateful mistake by the European Union's diplomacy
regarding the behavior of the EU towards Former Yugoslavia was made
very early, namely on July, 13, 1991, when the unilateral Slovenian and
Croatian Declarations of independence dated back only a few days. The
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remaining eleven Member States rejected a document prepared by the
Dutch government, which suggested a study of whether there was an
option to enable an agreement on border modifications between the
Yugoslav republics. The fact that these internal boundaries were
immediately accepted as internationally binding deprived many Serbs of
the hope of rejoining Yugoslavia and ultimately proved to be a
diplomatic disaster.
12
The second mistake was in the European Union imposing itself
upon the parties as the only mediator within the Yugoslavian conflict,
excluding the United Nations from the process and ultimately granting
the UN a negotiation role only after ample resistance.1 3 In many parts of
the Brussels administration and in Washington the UN is still criticized
today.
Despite these mistakes, particularly after the Kosovo crisis, it
became obvious that in order to meet its goals the EU would need both
military and non-military means. Even though the military dimension is
frequently of crucial importance, the non-military dimension also plays a
central role. The character of conflicts has changed radically during this
bloody century: While in World War I, 85 per cent of the victims were
soldiers and only 15 per cent were civilians, this ratio has almost been
inverted. With the interdependence of societies increasing, factors such
as economic aids, the free flow of information and unconstrained
communication gain more and more importance with regard to conflict
management and conflict prevention. Therefore, the European Union
must avail itself of the entire spectrum of instruments including military
and non-military measures.
The EU experience in the Balkans supports this view. Early
efforts of the European Union to contain the conflict in Former
Yugoslavia failed due to the lack of political will and courageous actions.
Later contributions to the restoration of peace and to the reconstruction
of those shattered states also did not have the desired effect. One part of
the problem existed in the lack of reactivity, a circumstance which
ultimately undermines the reliability of a protagonist.
That is exactly what happened in October 1993 during the
negotiations for joint EU action for humanitarian assistance to Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Council spent four months discussing whether the
operation would be covered by the community budget or whether it
12 See D. Owen, Eine wirksame GASP far die Zukunft, The Philip Morris
Institute for Public Policy-Research, Wie kann Europa Konflikte verhindem? 33
(Nov. 1997).13See D. Owen at 33.
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should be covered by the national budgets of the Member States. In the
meantime, winter ended and the population rejected the humanitarian
assistance that was finally granted.
Better results are necessary. The EU response in Kosovo has
signaled new start, demonstrating that small, fast, appropriate operations
are often more successful than large scale actions which ultimately arrive
too late. Citizens correctly expect the European Union to take an active
role in conflict prevention or that it at least is able to master the conflicts
in its own backyard. 14 Thus, it is hardly amazing that "Brussels" is
criticized, if the European Union is not capable of protecting funda-
mental human rights in the heart of Europe.
Frankly, the mistakes are simply too expensive. If the European
Union does not play a pro-active role in world politics, then it will face
enormous costs resulting from refugee aid, mine clearance and-after the
end of a conflict-reconstruction assistance. This is without even
mentioning the horrific losses of human lives and the welfare costs that
accrue where the European Union has not acted or not acted in time.
Instead of fighting the fires, the EU should rather focus on the causes of
the fires. The European Union has to find ways to use its economic
influence strategically in such a manner as to prevent the emergence of
fires or to at least diffuse them immediately after having emerged. What
Europe needs is not only to master crisis management, but likewise to
formulate a policy of conflict prevention. To this end, the Member States
have clearly detected the advantages of collective action-wherever it
appears suitable-in relation to unilateral measures. This is the existen-
tial purpose of the European Union. In cooperation with other states the
costs and risks linked to an operation are by far smaller, and the
collective power of the European Union is larger than the sum of its
individual parts.
M. The Development of the ESDI and Its
Relation to NATO
A. The Regulation of the CFSP by the Treaty of Amsterdam
Articles 11 to 28 of the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the
Treaty on European Union15 tie in with European Political Cooperation
14 See C. Patten at 9.
15 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED
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(EPC) within the field of Foreign and Security Policy. From the
perspective of international law, this cooperation had been introduced as
binding on the parties by the ratification of the Single European Act
(SEA) of 1986. Likewise, Article 16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam
requires mutual information and consultation among the Member States
in the Council of Ministers on any matter of foreign and security policy
of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted
as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.16
However, due to the fact that the Union is not a subject of
international law, from a legal perspective the Member States remain the
exclusive source of authority with regard to the Union's foreign and
security policy. In the context of the CFSP the European Council
occupies the leading function. On Common Foreign and Security Policy,
the Council of the EU takes "the decisions necessary for defining and
implementing this policy, on the basis of general guidelines defined by
the European Council. 17 The Presidency shall consult the European
Parliament "on the main aspects and the basic choices"'8 of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. The European Parliament may ask
questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. The
Commission has to be fully integrated in the work on the CFSP.
Generally, the measures on Common and Foreign Policy are not
justiciable and thus can not be the basis for an action in a court of justice.
If the Member States in the context of the CFSP fail to fulfill their
membership obligations arising out of Art. 10 para. 2 EC Treaty, treaty
violation proceedings pursuant to Art. 226 EC are possible.
According to Article 13 paragraph 1, the European Council
defines "the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign
and security policy." Only on the basis of these general guidelines the
Council of Ministers of the Union may become active regarding the
CFSP, in particular adopting joint actions and common positions.' 9 As
specification of targets of foreign and security policy, the general
guidelines of the European Council are mandatory for the Council of
Ministers of the Union. Accordingly, the European Council has to grant
ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM].
16 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 16.
S7 Id. at art. 13 para. 3.
" 1d. at art. 21.
19 See C. Koenig, A. Haratsch, Europarecht, 3. AUFL. 297, (Tilbingen 2000).
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the Council of the EU substantial leeway to specify the means of
implementation.
Under Article 13, paragraph 2, the European Council decides on
"common strategies" to be implemented by the Union in areas where the
Member States have important interests in common. Common strategies
shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made
available by the Union and the Member States. While general guidelines
defined by the European Council relating to the goals of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy are mandatory so that the Council has to
meet those guidelines in choosing appropriate means for adopting joint
actions, the common strategies shall indicate not only their objectives
and duration, but additionally the means to be made available to the
Union. In principal, the community budget covers the expenses.
Pursuant to Article 15, paragraph 1, the Council of Ministers of
the Union can adopt common positions. Those positions "define the
approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or
thematic nature."20 Common positions serve primarily to coordinate the
foreign policies of the Member States. They are a means of
implementing the common strategies adopted by the European Council.
The common positions are adopted by the Member States in order to
coordinate their actions in international organizations and at international
conferences. There, the Presidency represents the common positions of
the Union. If, as in the UN Security Council, only particular Member
States are permanent members (so far only Great Britain and France),
those states are under the obligation of appropriately representing the
positions of the Union.
Under Article 15, the Member States "ensure that their national
policies conform to the common positions."21 Therefore, this means of
action is partly only awarded a politically binding effect. As far as no
common position has been accomplished, the Member States may take
unilateral or bilateral measures of foreign and security policy. However,
pursuant to Article 16, the Member States remain obligated to participate
in the information and consultation in the Council of Ministers of the
European Union in order to coordinate their procedures.
While Article 30 of the SEA granted every Member State the
right to query the concerted actions within the European Political
Cooperation at any time-even without a previous formal and joint
avoidance-the EU Treaty designates a procedure and a legal basis for
joint actions which are binding on the Member States with regard to their
20 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 15 para. 1.
21 id.
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statements and their actions. Joint actions address "specific situations
where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. '22 The
Council of the EU bears the strategic responsibility during the
implementation of joint actions. In case of "a change in circumstances
having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the
Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take
the necessary decisions."23 According to Article 14 paragraph 2, "the
joint action shall stand" as long as the Council has not taken action.
In all events, in cases of "imperative need arising from changes
in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take
the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the
general objectives of the joint action. 24 If one of the Member States
takes such measures, it shall inform the Council immediately. The
Council can adapt necessary measures for an appropriate solution at
time. In addition, if a Member State encounters any major difficulties in
implementing a joint action, it shall refer them to the Council.
According to Article 23, decisions on Common Foreign and
Security Policy are taken by the Council acting unanimously. "By
derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by
qualified majority: (1) when adopting joint actions, common positions or
taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy; (2) when
adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common
position."25
The Council of the EU may, acting by a qualified majority,
request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision
by unanimity. Only regarding procedural questions may a decision be
taken by the majority of the members of the Council.
In accordance with Article 23, abstaining in a vote where
decision by unanimity is required does not prevent the adoption of a
decision. However, a decision subject to one of the states abstaining is
only binding on this state as long as it does not make a formal declaration
to not be obligated to implement the decided measure.
Paragraph 2 of Article 23 provides that "the votes of the
members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article
205 paragraph 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.' 26
22Id. at art. 14 para. 1.
23Id. at art. 14 para. 2.24 Id. at art. 14 para. 6.
' Id. at art. 23 (2).
26id.
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To this end, Article 23, paragraph 2 provides for a quorum where
the adoption of a decision requires "at least 62 votes in favor, cast by at
least 10 members" of the European Union. It has to be noted that this
paragraph categorically excludes majority decisions for adopting
"decisions having military or defense implications"; here, the principle of
strict unanimity applies already on the level of the Council of Ministers,
not only on the highest level of the Heads of State or Government in the
European Council.
Article 24 authorizes the Council of the European Union to
conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organiza-
tions in implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
"Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously
on a recommendation from the Presidency."27 However, the provisions of
Articles 24 and 38 of the Treaty on the European Union and agreements
concluded pursuant to these articles do not transfer or delegate
competences of the Member States to the European Union.
This explanation in accordance with the rules of international
law counteracts on one hand the assertion of an implied conferment of
legal personality to the EU. On the other hand, this ekplanation clarifies
the intergovernmental proportions of allocation. The Council concludes
the agreements in implementation of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy only in representation of the Member States-whereas not for the
European Union itself.
The Presidency of the Council is integrated into a so-called
TROIKA. With regard to the internal and external representation and the
implementation of decisions the Presidency is assisted by the Secretary-
General of the Council who is in the position of a High Representative
for the CFSP. If necessary, support is also provided by the Member State
that presides over the succeeding Council. In accordance with Article 18,
paragraph 5, the Council can appoint "a special representative with a
mandate in relation to particular policy issues" if the Council considers
this necessary.
In comparison to the old TROIKA the participation of the High
Representative for the CFSP in the new TROIKA ensures-apart from
the participation of the Commission-the necessary working continuity.
This working continuity, institutionalized in the person of the High
Representative for the CFSP, is underpinned by the tasks that are
assigned to him by Article 26. The High Representative contributes
particularly to "the formulation, preparation and implementation of
2 7 Id. at art. 24.
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political decisions"28 and-if necessary-on request of the Presidency to
"conducting political dialogue with third parties.' 29
The institution of a policy planning and early warning unit has
not been included in the CFSP title of the EU Treaty. Last but not least in
order to enable pragmatic modification adjustments apart from the
formal procedure of a treaty revision, the institution of a policy planning
and early warning unit has only been included in form of a declaration in
the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In light of the strictly
intergovernmental character of the CFSP, references in the declaration as
to foreign and security policy interests of the Union are to be understood
as imperative to respect the national identities of the Member States and
their position as exclusive body of authority within the area of CFSP.
In contrast to the Treaty of Maastricht-which alluded to an
implementation of a common defense policy "in the long run"--Article
17 paragraph 1 now designates the gradual stipulation thereof. A
common defense is however only possible inasmuch as the European
Council decides to implement it and in so far as the Member States ratify
this decision in accordance with their constitutional provision.
30
The Treaty of Amsterdam intensifies the possibilities for a
recourse to the WEU, which had already been designed in the Treaty of
Maastricht3' as "access to an operational capability., 32 Only in the mid-
eighties began a phase of political revival of the WEU, which obtained
the importance of a European pillar of NATO. The European Union can
engage the WEU for the elaboration and implementation of its defense
policy decisions and actions. The so-called "Petersberg tasks" that have
been determined by the Council of Ministers of the WEU in 1992
represent the main focus of the Common Defense Policy. The
"Petersberg tasks," which have been incorporated into Article 17
paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, cover humanitarian functions
and rescue missions, peacekeeping tasks as well as combat missions in
crisis management including peace-building measures.33
Article 17, paragraph 3 awards the European Council the
authority of defining the general guidelines also regarding the WEU.
Nevertheless, the WEU still remains a subject of international law on its
2 1Id. at art. 26.
29 rd.
31 See C. Koenig, A. Haratsch at 304.
31 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].32 Id. at art. 17 para. 1.
33 id.
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own. In the context of the Common Defense Policy the European Union
honors the existing obligations of those Member States which at the
same time are contracting parties of NATO.
B. Resolutions of Helsinki and Important
Results for the Future ESDI
Finland assumed the Presidency of the Council on July 1, 1999,
and worked briskly on the tasks for further development of the CSFP
assigned by the Cologne Summit. The Finnish Council Presidency was
particularly suitable to mediate in relation to the doubts of the other
states that are not bound by treaty and those that hold a neutral position.
Furthermore, with the support of these states the Presidency succeeded in
placing emphasis on the area of civil crisis management. The
specifications for the benchmark figures that were agreed upon in
Helsinki relating to military crisis management certainly derived from an
intensive consultation process between the four large Member States
France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy, as well as from the first
meeting of the Secretaries of State and Defense in the context of the
General Council.
In Helsinki, the European Council emphasized "its determination
to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO
as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military
operations in response to international crises. 34 For this purpose, the
European Council agreed upon a headline goal, according to which the
Member States by voluntary cooperation have to become ready by the
year 2003 "to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year
military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range
of Petersberg tasks."35
Additionally, the European Council accepted the report of the
Finnish Council Presidency regarding the military aspects of the CESDP.
According to this report, "collective capability goals in the fields of
command and control, intelligence and strategic transport 36 have to be
developed, because the survey and inspection of the European
capabilities by the WEU discovered serious weaknesses particularly
34 Presidential Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December
1999, para. 27.35 See id. at para. 28.
36 Presidential Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December
1999, Annex I to Annex IV: Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki
European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security
and Defence, Introduction.
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within these areas.3 7 Furthermore, the Council decided that "new political
and military bodies will be established within the Council to enable the
Union to take decisions on EU-led Petersberg operations and to ensure,
under the authority of the Council, the necessary political control and
strategic direction of such operations" 38 and that "[p]rinciples for
cooperation with non-EU European NATO members" (Turkey, Norway,
Iceland, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) and other European partners
in EU-led military crisis management will be agreed, without prejudice
to the Union's decision-making autonomy."'39
Although the number of armed forces to be provided by the
European Union appears not excessively high, the Member States still
commit themselves to make more soldiers available than they have at
their crisis management command at present. In addition, they will have
to equip the twofold or threefold number of armed forces in downgraded
standby level in order to enable a deployment of at least one year by
rotation.
It was stressed clearly that the armed forces available to the
European Union are not linked to the creation of an integrated "European
Army". Hardly any one of the Member States was ready for such a
project, and this would also have encountered a massive opposition on
the side of the American allies. Moreover, the armed forces elements that
are joined ad hoc in case of need shall be deployed exclusively for crisis
management, while the collective defense remains reserved for NATO.
This was one condition sine qua non not only to calm NATO but in
particular also to obtain the consent for the entire project of the neutral
Member States and the Member States not bound by treaty.40
Helsinki was the beginning of a coherent and pragmatic
European response. Insofar, the Commission as initiator of the
Community Policy and as its manager pursued five targets: (1) To be
actively involved in the design of policy within all pillars of the
European Union; (2) To take on executive functions in those areas,
where it possesses contractual authority; (3) To improve its ability for the
fast implementation of decisions; (4) To increase the contribution of the
Community policies within the area of conflict prevention and finally,
(5) To ensure the industrial basis for a reliable security and defense
policy.
37 See id.38 1d.
39 id.40 See M. Jopp at 245.
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Where the Commission prepares suggestions for the Council in
the context of the first pillar of the Treaty of Amsterdam, there is an
intensive search for a Community interest. On the other hand, within the
area of decision making of the CFSP practically no such preparatory
phase exists. The Common Strategies, which were created as new
instrument of the CFSP, represent an attempt to face this weakness.
However, there is a long way to go in order to achieve a substantial
harmonization between the perceptions of national and European
interests. By nature, this is even more difficult to implement in crisis
situations and in light of potential conflicts.
Even if the parties correspond with regard to the assessment of a
potential conflict, the problem still exists to decide as to when and how
to intervene. Preventive diplomacy focuses all too often on situations,
where a violent conflict is already probable or where its outbreak is
imminent. Then, strategies to face the acute threat are contrived. Such
strategies may contribute crucially to avert the outbreak of aggression at
short notice. However, it is not likely that these reach the roots of the
conflict. Long-term prevention, which aims at the structural causes of a
conflict, can include for example measures for the promotion of
democracy, "good governance" and human rights. This could be
achieved for example by economic aids and the satisfaction of
fundamental needs (health, welfare, lodging etc.). Further measures
would concern the promotion of political and economic cooperation on a
regional level as well as networking by trade and other forms of
transnational exchange. This could include incentives for the reform of
the juridical system and of the security forces or for the protection of the
environment, in order to achieve a sustainable economic policy.
41
The Union has developed a whole arsenal of sanctions and
restrictive measures. These measures reach from the restriction of
visitations and diplomatic contacts to the suspension of assistance and
trade privileges up to complete sanctions or embargoes that paralyze the
trade, block the traffic and freeze capital investments as well as capital
transfers.
Finally, the support of human rights, democracy and a
functioning juridical system has to be mentioned. The compliance with
human rights forms one of the comer pillars of the European Union. It is
expressly embodied in the contract. It can be seriously affirmed that the
Common Foreign Policy is compatible with these targets-not at all
because human rights are a European discovery, or because the European
Union requests a monopoly on their observance. Human rights are
41 See C. Patten at 12.
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universal. The promotion of human rights and democratic values is a
useful venture, both in economic and strategic respect. The political-
economic nature of numerous fields of activity of the European Union
explains how important Community Policies are as instruments of
conflict prevention and how necessary it is to integrate them into broader
strategies. Here, the Commission is needed. However, the goals and
intentions of the EU in all these areas have to be clearly determined.
The European Union needs clear targets for non-military actions,
in order to complete those within the military area. Presently, a
comprehensive inventory of the non-military instruments of the Member
States and the European Union is created. It represents a first basis for
the efforts within this important area.
* Within the area of humanitarian assistance the European Union
has already joint capacities at its command: through ECHO exists a
constant instrument of coordination for emergency assistance,
disaster relief, as well as logistic support;
* Now, the European Union has to establish the equivalent for the
area of emergency and rescue services: The basic operational
readiness, the supply of logistics, search and rescue capacities, the
security of the population, radiation protection. Specific objectives in
each of these areas have to be defined.
* Just as this, the European Union has to determine the same
numerical strength of civil and military police forces which it can
mobilize for training and for relocation in the context of special
missions. In Helsinki, the heads of government already agreed on a
target passage for the relocation of troops. This has to be completed
by an appropriate guideline for paramilitary and police forces;
* A further important area is mine clearing and deactivation of
mines: Here, the European Union has to be capable of a rapid
deployment of mine clearing operation commands, in order to grant
assistance to mine victims as fast as possible. Furthermore, the
research within the area of sensor and detector technology must be
intensified. Perhaps that does not sound too exciting; however, if the
European Union wants to fulfill the task that it is called upon, this is
also an important target;
* In Kosovo the European Union has recognized that still more
action is required in the area of conflict post-processing review and
reconstruction. Additionally, the European Union must be able to
coordinate and mobilize resources. This central function includes
measures concerning demilitarization, the so-called "micro
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disarmament", support of the organization of a civil society and the
like;
The promotion of human rights and democracy should
likewise rely on clearly defined resources. In addition, the European
Union needs observers, who watch over the compliance with human
rights, selection observers, media advisors and experts of different
fields of activity for the creation of institutions;
Finally, the European Union should be clear as to its targets and
have a conception of which type of assistance it can offer, if a
conflict offers leeway for mediation, an arbitral tribunal, investiga-
tions or certain confidence-building measures.
An effective European policy requires a strongly improved
coordination. The Helsinki European Council identified this and assigned
the next Presidency to resume the work within the area of the
coordination of non-military crisis management in order to complete the
military structures. Council and Commission have to cooperate closely in
order to achieve a stronger coherence within those policy areas in which
the European Union shares extensive responsibilities.
A further large challenge in designing a reliable CSFP is its
continuity. The Council Presidency of the European Union changes
every six months and with it the responsibility to represent the Union in
affairs of the CSFP. The appointment of Javier Solana as High
Representative and his function to support the Presidency is thus crucial
for the stabilization of the CSFP on the highest political level. The
Commission inheres an important role and responsibility to jointly
ensure a coherent external representation of the Community.
Approximately 160 states are accredited to the EEC. In most of these
states only the representations of the European Commission are a
permanent component of the TROIKA. The 128 delegations of the
Commission contribute to the profile of the European Union in many
parts of the world where a coherent Union policy is expected and
appreciated. Through the function they fulfill, the delegations receive a
special status within the area of the diplomacy of the European Union.
First of all, Helsinki signified the beginning of a new phase in
the rapid development of a European Security and Defense Policy.
However, further important decisions regarding the role of the European
Union as well as of the Commission were still pending. Agreements had
to be reached as to the participation in the design, adoption as well as
implementation of decisions; this applied in particular to the European
NATO members, that do not belong to the European Union, as well as to
VOL. 10
NATO AND ESDI
those states that are Member States of the EU but not of NATO, and in
addition also to those states that support the policy of the union.
Second, which ever decisions the European Union may take, it
will always affect its NATO allies. The Union has to ensure that their
concerns are fully and completely taken into consideration. The NATO
allies do not raise so many reservations against the success of a CSDP,
but rather against the risk of its failure. Therefore, it is in everyone's
interest that the common policy actually functions.
For this purpose the European Union has to develop to a certain
extent a culture of cooperation and coordination, and this not only within
the European Union, but jointly with its most important partners in the
context of other larger international fora. Within those international
organizations which are active in the area of conflict prevention and
crisis management, the Union has to engage likewise with a substantial
and purposeful policy: This concerns in particular the United Nations,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council
of Europe. For the Commission and the Member States of the European
Union it was of vital interest to use in this manner their individual and
collective resources for the defense of specifically European interests.42
Third, due to its formal authority, its experience and its budget
authorities the Commission played quite a role within the European
security and defense policy.
Fourth, the Community's contribution to the design of the basic
framework conditions of the Security and Defense Policy (the
Commission's role as an initiator of proposals in the areas of research
policy, domestic market and sourcing, its role as catalyst on the way to a
larger convergence of the defense industries-an almost essential basis
for the CESDP) is of central importance. Beyond that, the contribution is
of central importance to the arms markets, where the improvement of the
competitive position of the European armaments industry is at stake; the
same applies to the trade with armament goods. The Member States of
the European Union import seven times more armament goods from the
USA than they export. Each Member State has its own relevant import
regulations. Here pooling appears inevitable and almost essential.
Fifth, the stronger role of the Union in the area of conflict
prevention indicates that it encourages the people and the societies they
live in to take on reforms, and that it supports them in their efforts on the
way to economic prosperity and "good governance". Ultimately, the
targets of the Union have to be clearly articulated and transferred
resolutely.
42 See C. Patten at 16.
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C. The ESDI in Relation to NATO
The years since the unification of Germany and the political
change in Eastern Europe are influenced by America's and Europe's
search for new concepts with regard to foreign policy and for responses
to international developments that increasingly appear too complex.
America's alleged foreign policy disorientation is disapproved of in a
dramatic way. A position statement issued by the "Commission for
America's National Interests" criticized the unclear ad-hoc-policy of the
Clinton administration and deduced from it a potential threat to fortune,
the values and even the existence of America.43 Within these and
comparable American considerations Europe and the alliance with the
European states always play an important role. As central concerns the
political-military alliance with the European partners, the security of the
partner countries and the preservation of the American leadership-also
in the military field-are mentioned. However, the majority of the
remaining targets and tasks, as for example the prevention of the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, likewise requires a long term strategic
cooperation with the European Union and with the European NATO
partners.
The United States government assigns European-American
relations a central role in the foreign policy target catalog. The then
national security advisor of the American president, Samuel R. Berger,
identified six strategic targets44 of American foreign policy in a speech in
March 1997:
1. Work on an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe;
2. Organization of a strong stable Asian-Pacific community;
3. Promotion of America as crucial power for the peace in the
world;
4. Establishment of a stronghold against transnational security
challenges;
5. Creation of jobs by establishing a more open commercial
system;
6. Retention of a strong military, which avails of the necessary
means for the fulfillment of the mentioned tasks.
43 See A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON AMERICA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS
(Cambridge 1996).
44 See Berger, Samuel R., Speech before the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington (March 27, 1997) in: Amerikadienst, April 9,
issued by: United States Information Service, Bonn 1997.
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Despite these-only at first sight unambiguous-objectives,
America is still on the search for a foreign policy strategy that finds the
correct balance between the poles of an inwardly oriented
unilateralism-that sometimes shows isolationist tendencies-and a
global power policy that is oriented towards national interests.4 s
If the American-Europe Security Policy is regarded under the
aspect of the superior foreign policy line of the Clinton Administration,
i.e. the founding and expansion of an open world trade system
constructed upon democracies that are oriented towards free markets,
then it becomes clear that the United States will also in the future seek to
play a leading role on the European continent. Contrariwise, the
Europeans have realized at the latest since their failure in Bosnia and the
example of the Kosovo conflict that they have to have a common interest
in a continued presence and a long-term commitment of the United
States on the European continent.
The attempts of France to repel the American influence in
Europe, which were also revealed by the specific role of the Frenchmen
within the discussions on reforms and targets of NATO, are specifically
problematic for the Germans who maintain with both, the Frenchmen
and the Americans, particularly close relations and who consider a
continued and strong commitment of the United States in Europe as
condition sine qua non of their foreign policy.
46
The foreign and security political profile of the European Union
does not correspond to that of a state.4 7 The economic and bureaucratic
complexity of integration of the European Union does not have a
counterpart within the areas of foreign and security policies. The
transatlantic relations are rather structured by a multiplicity of
organizations and bilateral patterns of relations, whose core represents
NATO. The attempt of the European states to speak with one voice and
act jointly has a long history in the course of the integration process.
The motives to build up a CFSP were and are still of various
kind. The increasing self-confidence of the European NATO states in
light of the increasing economic success of the European Union, the need
to solve regional European problems themselves and to not only appear
as junior partner of the superpower United States, special national
4 S See POSEN, BARRY, AND ROSS, COMPETING U.S. GRAND STRATEGIES 100-34
(Lieber, Robert J. Ed. 1997).
46 See insofar Moisiv and Dominique, The Trouble with France, 3 Foreign
Affairs --, 94-104 (1998).
47 See ALGIERI, FRANCO, DIE REFORM DER GASP- ANLEITUNG ZU BEGRENZTEM
GEMEINSAMEN HANDELN 87-118 (Werner Hrsg., Giitersloh 1998).
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interests outside of the NATO competences and not least the French
efforts to obtain a leading role have frequently led to irritations between
the transatlantic partners. In addition, during the Cold War the European
NATO states preserved fears concerning bilateral agreements between
the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union.
Europe tried to face the structural dilemma of having to
coordinate a multiplicity of-often conflicting-national interests to
represent a joint determined attitude towards the USA by founding a
common foreign policy. Already in 1970, France understood the
organization of an independent European identity with regard to foreign
policy within the EPC as a conscious attempt of a delimitation toward the
United States. A German thrust was required to inform the transatlantic
partner USA promptly in each case about activities of the Community
with regard to foreign policy. At first, the member states treated the
question of the inclusion of the security and defense policy into the EPC
extremely controversially and finally tacitly excluded it, in order not to
touch on NATO competences and not to burden the transatlantic alliance.
In the seventies and eighties, fears of the European NATO
partners as to a bilateralism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union at
expense of the Europeans as well as to the reliability of the American
nuclear screen for Europe became audible. The transatlantic partnership
was never free from cause of conflicts. Even on the acme of the Soviet
threat towards Western Europe severe conflicts regarding the European
and American foreign policy involvement in countries and regions like
Palestine, Suez and Viet Nam characterized the relations between the
U.S. and the European NATO states.48 There were differences also
concerning the deployment of intermediate range missiles (NATO's
"double decision"). Quasi permanently, the allies discussed the question
of the costs of the American troop deployment. All in all, however, the
North Atlantic partnership proved as stable foundation and the most
important pillar of the bipolar international structure.
The disappearance of the danger of a nuclear world war between
the superpowers and the fact that the possibility of a comprehensive
conventional war between West and East Europe had become
inconceivable in a period less than a decade have-in connection with
the increasingly social, economic and technical globalization-let the
classical security policy of the Cold War become void. The threat to the
West derives no longer from an over-powerful opponent, but from a
48 See KAHLER & MILES, REvISION uND VORAUSSCHAU: HISTORISCHE
INTERPRETATION UND DIE ZUKUNFT DER TRANSATLANTISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN
37 (Gfitersloh 1995).
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military, power-political vacuum and from a latent instability in Eastern
Europe where at the same time the new democracies are still lacking
economic stability.49 The reorientation of NATO including the opening
to the East and the cooperation with Russia shall aim at the creation of a
security order that comprises Europe entirely, including Russia. In
addition, it shall prevent the development of gray areas and dividing
lines.
This also includes the signing of the Founding Act and the
installation of a Joint Council with Russia. At the same time "the new
NATO understands itself as an organization whose political readiness
and military capacity for intervening shall give stability to the changed
Europe".50 In the context of the summit of the 19 NATO states on the
occasion of the 50 th anniversary of the alliance's existence (April 23-25,
1999) in Washington, a summit communiqu6 and the new strategic
concept were adopted. Contents and targets are the readiness of NATO to
take on tasks within the range of crisis management and crisis prevention
under UN and OSCE mandate. Further elements are, among others, the
action plan for membership, an initiative for the stabilization of the
alliance's interoperability as well as the revaluation of the role of the
European Union within NATO by designing a European Security and
Defense Identity.
Europeans and Americans jointly promote the process of
integration and opening of the West in relation to the new Eastern
European democracies. This opening process is embedded into an overall
approach that includes the NATO-Russia-Founding Act, the NATO-
Ukraine-Charter as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Russia
was offered disarmament negotiations, economic aid, acknowledgment
as equal participant in the summit of the leading industrial nations and a
politically, but not legally, binding agreement on the regulation of the
relations with NATO.
America and Europe adjust to new and different challenges in
security policy matters. U.S. President Clinton signed a new directive for
the atomic target planning of the United States in November 1997.51
Accordingly, the U.S. should now be no more able to lead and win a
comprehensive nuclear war, but should be capable of providing for a
reliable deterrence of "rogue states." At present, countries such as Iraq,
Iran, the Sudan and Afghanistan fall within this category. The extension
of NATO to the East has several coherent target dimensions, which also
49 See Link and Wemer at 143.
50 Feldmeyer & Karl, Die alte und die neue NATO, FAZ (May 6, 1998).
51See Wieland & Leo, Clintons neue Atomstrategie, FAZ (December 29, 1997).
Fall 2002
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
contain the security and promotion of the young Eastern European
democracies. The NATO and European Union membership for Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary shall provide the people not only with
prosperity and security, but shall also lead to the organization of a civil
society, stabilization of the free-market economy, democratization as
well as the rule of law.
5 2
In December 1997, NATO agreed on a new command structure.
France approved it likewise, even though under the reservation that
Europe had to be represented more strongly in the command structure.
According to Paris, the post of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces,
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) in Naples, which is occupied by a U.S.
general, shall be taken overby a European. However, this has so far been
rejected by the Americans. Since France left the integrated command
structure in the year 1966, there are frequent dissentions of the
Frenchmen with the Americans. Above all, Paris has its own opinion on
the role of the WEU as security political institution in Europe. The
Frenchmen led a "quasi-theological controversy" about functions and
orientation of the WEU in relation to NATO. 3 According to the
representation of former Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus
Kinkel, the Europeans see the WEU as an axis between the European
Union and NATO, which shall enable a more efficient crisis
management in Europe in the future.
With regard to security policy there are a whole series of
controversies as well concerning strategic as also personnel and tactic
issues. They do not, however, touch on the alliance as such or on its core
self-conception. The concerns towards a further European integration
and towards the organization of a European security identity that had
been brought forward in the beginning of the nineties by US President
Bush and his Secretary of State, George Baker, have been replaced by a
positive evaluation and according support in the meantime.5 4 The
Americans wish for a significantly stronger involvement of the
Europeans in the field of security policy.
In Europe, there is also criticism as to the American role and
ideas concerning the form of future partnership. The critics find fault the
52 See Zoellick & Robert, NATO's Next Mission, 87-95 Weidenfeld, Wemer
(Hrsg), Creating Partnership - The Future of Transatlantic Relations. The
Bellevue-Meetings II, (Gitersloh 1997).
53 See Hoffinann & Stanley, The United States and Western Europe, 81
Lieber).
See Frankenberger & Klaus-Dieter, Zivilmacht oder Weltmacht, 8 FAZ
(November 1997).
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different strategic security and foreign political target projections of the
partners as well as the entirely different respective self-conception. The
Americans are blamed for weakening NATO's independence and for
trying to make it more and more subject to the American global power
interestsF5 America's demands as global order authority and only
military superpower implicate the provision and maintenance of military
potentials that also have to be co-funded by Europe. Political involve-
ments and strategies necessary for this have to be added; however, right
now those appear hardly compatible with a Common European Foreign
Policy.
According to the decisions of Helsinki, there are several new
military and political bodies that must be founded until the end of the
year 2000.
* A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in
Brussels which consists of national representatives (high government
officials or diplomats), addresses all questions of the CFSP and acts
under "supervision of the Council" in the case of military operations;
* A Military Committee (MC) consistent of military delegates of
the Member States' Chiefs of Defense which convene in certain
intervals on the level of the Chiefs of Staff, which advises the PSC in
military questions and whose president (a four star general)
participates in the council session if necessary;
* A European Military Staff (MS), which is primarily in charge
of the situation assessment and strategic planning. 6
As the decisions regarding the structures were to be made only at
the end of the year 2000 in Nice, it was agreed to create so-called interim
bodies from March 2000 on, whereas the interim PSC first works under
the direction of the Political Committee. The Council Secretariat is
initially only compounded by a handful of military experts of the
Member States who shall form the nucleus for the Council's later
military staff consisting of approximately 150 military experts. The
difficulty of the EU Member States to agree upon the final structure and
function of these new bodies underlines the sensitivity of the issue.
In an unspectacular way but with rapid speed, the Portuguese
Presidency dedicated itself to the promotion of the Common European
Security and Defense Policy (CESDP). After an open exchange of ideas
in the General Council on January 24, where particularly the Nordic
55 See Schmidt & Hans-Joachim, Folgenreicher Stillstand, 10 FAZ (Juni. 1998).
16 See Jopp at 245.
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Member States, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands demonstrated
a clear interest in the composition of mechanisms of civil crisis
management and also where the regional delimitation of possible
military mission options to the European continent was addressed, the
Council already created the interim bodies on February 14. Starting on
March 1, these new bodies began to elaborate on the various aspects of
the CESDP under close cooperation with the High Representative for the
CFSP, Javier Solana, who was assigned to additionally occupy the office
of the Secretary-General of the WEU in November 1999.
Substantial impulses for a concretion of the military dimension
emanated from the informal meeting of the European Union Secretaries
of Defense in Sintra (February 2000), as well as from a meeting of the
Chiefs of Defense and the sessions of the Secretaries of State and
Defense in the context of the General Council on March 20 and June 13.
The extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Lisbon, to which
the Portuguese Presidency had submitted a short interim report on the
CESDP, primarily discussed aspects of the relations with NATO and
with the European NATO members that are not members of the EU as
well as the relations with the candidates for accession to the EU.57
Whereas in particular Greece and France stressed the need for
perpetuating the EU's autonomy as to the structure of these relations,
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Great Britain pushed for rights of
participation of the other states within the CESDP as extensive as
possible. On their summit in Mainz (June 9, 2000), Germany and France
determined their proceeding within the development of the CESDP,
stressed to the public the strong interest in the European Union as
security political protagonist and opted with view to the central military
weaknesses of the Europeans for the building of the airbus A 400M as
military large capacity transport aircraft and for the development of an
independent satellite tracking system.58
Briefly before the summit in Feira, a council committee for civil
crisis management took up its work. Originally, it seemed as if
specifically this dimension of the CESDP became a domain of the
Commission. Commissioner Christopher Patten had asserted according
claims and had announced .extensive activities. After all, a coordination
mechanism for the cooperation with the Commission was created in the
Council's General Secretariat. Additionally, the Council identified
57 id.
58 See Presseberichterstattung tiber den deutsch-franz6sischen Gipfel in Mainz
in der Frankfurter Algemeinen Zeitung und der Siiddeutschen Zeitung vom
9.6.2000.
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priorities as to civil crisis management (humanitarian assistance,
stabilization of the rule of law, stabilization of civilian administrations,
rescue services, disaster control) and had concrete targets for the crisis
missions of police forces compiled.
The Feira European Council (June 19-20, 2000) underscored the
will of the European Union states to be able within the context of the
voluntary cooperation to make 5000 police officers available for civil
crisis management and to have 1000 policemen come into operation
within 30 days until the year 200359 (3300 policemen are presently
already deployed in the mission in Albania and in Former Yugoslavia).
Regarding the consultations with "third states", there was an agreement
that during the interim period that lasted until Nice there should be an
intensified political dialog in form of special meetings with the six
European NATO states that do not belong to the European Union. In this
connection, as also with regard to the principles concerning the
consultation and cooperation with NATO, the full autonomy of the
European Union in the adoption of decisions was stressed and
furthermore the principle of equality emphasized. Concretely, four ad-
hoe working groups were suggested for the cooperation with NATO
relating to the following sectors: safety standards applicable to classified
documents, development of military ability targets, modalities of the
access of the European Union to NATO resources, definition of
permanent arrangements with NATO. Regarding the question of contract
modifications due to the new political and military bodies the Portuguese
Presidency recommended a further examination until the summit in Nice.
The relation to NATO did not by any means develop in an
unproblematic way. While the development of the ESDP has been
supported on the official level in all NATO communiques since the
Washington Summit in 1999 under the condition that the principles of
transparency, consultation and non-discrimination are taken into account
by the NATO states, a skeptical attitude is widely spread in the NATO
headquarters in Brussels. The joint exercise with the WEU
(CMX/CRISEX 2000),60 which tested the utilization of NATO means by
the Europeans, has been sensed as a "culture shock" within parts of
NATO. Likewise, the prospect of an integration of neutral states and
states not bound by the pact into the cooperation between the European
Union and NATO, does not invoke undivided acceptance. The EU's
59 See Presidential Conclusions, Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000,
E ~ara. 11.
0See Porto-Declaration, WEU Council of Ministers 15-16 May 2000, Porto,
Atlantic Document Nr.111, 23.5.2000, para. 5.
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tendency towards representing an institutional carpenter's workshop is
being criticized. Therefore, NATO officials and representatives of the
U.S. administration measure the sincerity of the CESDP based on
whether it really succeeds to establish military abilities and to achieve
the headline goals until 2003. Particularly until spring 2000, the missing
transparency as to the institutional development promoted within the
European Union was criticized. Indeed, there was no institutionalized
contact at least until the joint establishment of the ad-hoc bodies with
NATO in the summer of 2000 except for the weekly informal breakfast
meetings of the Secretary-Generals of both organizations.
However, it has to be taken into consideration that since no later
than spring 2000 a certain interconnection with NATO exists relating to
personnel. Thus, most military delegates for example come from NATO
and carry a "double hat". Moreover, meetings with the Deputy NATO
Commander-in-Chief are intended in the context of the interim military
committee in order to elaborate on the headline goals and military
capability targets. Furthermore, the interim committee maintains also a
guideline task force in which NATO experts participate. Additionally, in
analogy to the tradition of the past joint meetings of the Permanent
Councils of NATO and WEU, a first session has taken place already in
September 2000.
The skepticism within NATO is partly reflected in the
ambivalent attitude of the USA. On the highest political level the CESDP
is supported; at the same time, however, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright made it clear already in October 1998 that the European
processes may not lead to the decoupling of NATO, to duplicating lines
of command or to the discrimination of European NATO partners that do
not belong to the European Union.61 The reason for these three
imperatives are the American concerns relating to a loss of control and
influence as well as fears regarding a possible consolidation of a EU core
within NATO.
62
At large, the basic American attitude will also in the upcoming
years rather be a "Yes, but." Moreover, in the opinion of high NATO
officials and American security experts there is still a period of five, if
not ten, years needed until the CESDP will be fully operative. Therefore,
61 See Madeleine Albright, The Right Balance will secure NATO's Future,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 10, 1998.
62 See Stanley R. Sloan, The United States and European Defence, Chaillot
Papers 39, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, April
2000, at 14-19.
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a longer period of recurring turbulences and resentments in the
transatlantic relation is yet to anticipate.
Contrary to American fears, the CESDP could however rapidly
become too dependent on NATO. On the one hand, for years the Union
has to rely on the recourse to means and capabilities of NATO in order to
implement complex military operations. Therefore, the resort option
preferred by Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy requires
the organization of well functioning close political and military-
operational relations with NATO. If NATO means are to be utilized, an
additional consensus decision in the Atlantic Council is needed, which in
the long run ensures the USA of a "droit de regard" with respect to
European actions. On the other hand the incompatibility of the
memberships of NATO and the European Union plays an important role.
Since the WEU, whose functions are in the majority assumed by the
European Union, granted large rights of participation to Turkey, Norway,
Iceland, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the U.S. and the
group of these six states expect the same of the European Union. The
actual problem concentrates on Turkey, which postulates an inclusion in
the EU decision-making process and thus mandates a revision of the
political dialog offered by the European Union with regard to the defense
sector. How serious threats of a Turkish blockade policy have to be taken
in the Atlantic Council will depend on the further perspective of an
accession to the European Union. Despite the dissatisfaction with
the consultation arrangements of Feira, after some hesitation, Turkey did
agree to the formation of the four ad-hoc groups in order not to endanger
the unity of NATO and to live up to its own new status as a candidate for
accession to the European Union. The attempt to urge for a partial
membership in the CFSP pillar by reaching through the CESDP back-
door is certainly obvious. However, this weak point in the construction
of the CESDP might still remain, as long as American policy does not
exert pressure toward an opening of the CFSP pillar. By all means,
crucial for the development of the CESDP is the constant effort for
communication and reinsurance with the U.S. and on the other hand to
design the dialog with the group of the six states in a way that a smooth
utilization of NATO means is possible if necessary.
IV. The Treaty of Nice: Results Concerning the CFSP
When the results of Nice are presented, a double distinction
should be made. On the one hand, it must be taken into consideration that
CFSP issues were discussed only regarding Articles 23 and 24 of the
Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 23, paragraph 2, which concerns the
appointment of special representatives for the CFSP, was amended in
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order to designate the possibility of a decision made by a qualified
majority with regard to a joint action and to the appointment of a special
representative in accordance with Article 18. Article 24, which concerns
the conclusion of international agreements within the area of the CFSP as
well as Justice and Home Affairs, has been fumdamentally replaced, in
order to require the qualified majority of the Council for the
implementation of a joint action or a common position. However,
unanimity is required if the agreement covers the acceptance of internal
decisions. This means that the new Treaty completely ignores the
European Parliament at the time of the conclusion of agreements on the
government level including CFSP.
On the other hand, parallel discussions were led in the Council
for General Affairs in order to prepare the Nice Summit. The report of
the French Council Presidency contained guidelines regarding the
necessity for modifications of the Treaties. The respective results were:
Article 17 EU was amended, i.e. the reference to the ultimate
integration of the WEU into the Union was deleted;
* Article 25 EU regarding the role of the Political and Security
Committee now establishes the possibility for the Council to
authorize this Committee to make relevant decisions concerning
political monitoring and strategic management;
* A declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy
within the appendix to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental
Conference records that within the course of the year 2001 and at the
latest during its meeting in LaekenlBrussels the European Council
will take a decision on the basis of the existing treaty provisions in
order to enable the Union to rapidly become operational. The entry
into force of the Treaty of Nice is therefore no prerequisite for this.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice extends the range of application of
enhanced cooperation within the area of the CFSP (second pillar). This is
a step forward in comparison to the past situation; however, a number of
important problems remain unresolved. First, the range of application
remains too limited, it will rest reduced to the implementation of joint
measures and common positions and will not be expanded to the Security
and Defense Policy. Second, the approval procedure represents a regress
compared with the procedure pursuant to the first pillar, and most
notably, a real democratic supervision in form of a consultation of the EP
has not been designated. Third, the Council takes its decision on the basis
of the vote of the qualified majority; each member state, however, has a
veto right.
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In accordance with the request of the EP all but one references to
the WTO in the modified Art. 17 EU were deleted. This article
determines that the CFSP will also contain the gradual development of a
Common Defense Policy. Nevertheless, all Council decisions taken since
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (Cologne, Helsinki, Feira
and Nice) refer to the military and civil instruments necessary for
compliance with the Petersberg missions. Defense policy as such remains
a national issue. The "Petersberg missions" (humanitarian and rescue
actions, peacekeeping missions as well as missions of armed forces
during crisis management including peace building measures) were
included in Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam and
become thereby part of the CFSP/CESDP.
It had already been decided in Helsinki that the Member States
which voluntarily cooperate in EU-led operations have to be able until
2003 to make available armed forces of up to 50,000-60,000 men within
60 days. Furthermore, it was determined that new political and military
bodies are assembled within the Council so that in accordance with the
decisions of Nice the following committees will be gradually constituted:
(a) a permanent Political and Security Committee; (b) the Military
Committee and (c) the Military Staff.
The report of the Council Presidency adopted in Nice explains
regarding the CESDP that the development of an autonomous ability of
decision making and the preparation and implementation of EU-led
military actions in response to international crises, where NATO does
not intervene as a whole, will enable the EU to implement the entire
spectrum of the Petersberg missions in accordance with the definition of
the Treaty of Amsterdam and that this does not signify the organization
of a European army. Thus, NATO remains the basis for the collective
defense of its members.
During the Feira European Council, four priority sectors were
determined (law enforcement, stabilization of the rule of law,
stabilization of civil administration and civil defense) within which the
Union has to develop its abilities for crisis management by civil means
both in the framework of UN and OSCE operations and within European
Union initiatives. The adoption of the regulation creating a crisis reaction
mechanism on February 26, 2001, has been a first and extremely
important step forward. With this step, the civil capability of the
European Union regarding a rapid and efficient intervention in crisis
situations in third countries is to be strengthened. In addition, the
mechanism will provide the necessary flexibility to mobilize rapidly
available instruments of the Community.
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V. Conclusion
In contrast to the EPC (European Political Cooperation) of the
seventies and CFSP of the nineties, it now appears as if the involved
Europeans for the first time meant what they said. It adds to the
reliability that the old blockades cannot take place any longer. Only those
are participating that are willing and able to put a strong foreign policy
into practice and to place soldiers in the field.
The rapid task force that is planned has the strength of a NATO
corps-50,000 to 60,000 men, including Air Forces and a naval
component. The task force shall be established by the end of the year
2002, shall be operational in each case within two months and shall
endure a mission of one year's length. The latter, however, requires that
the suitable missions are found. This cannot and should not be the classic
NATO case which Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty describes:
common defense of an attack directed toward the territory of a NATO
partner. There is no binding information as to the geographical range. In
principle, the range is unlimited.
However, the NATO-ESDI dividing lines are drawn, and the
Europeans will be in extraordinary need of NATO help and American
assistance in the areas of command, control, communication and
information. Something similar applies to transportation by sea and air.
This assistance, however, the U.S. will by no means grant
unconditionally.63
What the Europeans demand from themselves remains further
limited. But one suspects that in the bitter reality the boundaries are
flowing, that the ambition of the French and the British outreaches that
of the Germans and that at this point intra-European conflicts might
appear. The British want the European defense not to take place without
them in the context of the "euro corps" composed of German, French,
Belgian and Spanish units. They rather want to introduce their strategic
leadership abilities and their special relation with the USA into Europe,
particularly in the area of intelligence.
France views the ESDI as a chance to pull the other Europeans
into a Gaullist direction. The Germans want to save what there is still to
be saved of the Political Union, and feel a strategic backlog. There is also
a particular chance of conflicts with the Americans. In due form, they
have given their blessing to the ESDI and have promised to grant
assistance if necessary. However, the rudiment of a strategic dissent is
already present. For such operations will arise from which the Americans
63 See M.Stiirmer, ESDI ist ei Balanceakt fir Europider undAmerikaner, at
http://www.welt.de/daten/2000/02/05/0205aul50577.htx.
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stay away, be it because of their irrelevance-then it may be good--, be it
because of serious differences-then it is dangerous-or be it also,
because the U.S. is otherwise engaged.
In fact, the only remaining superpower-the U.S.-aims high,
literally with rocket defense and metaphorically with a revolution of the
military, the high-tech mega project of the battlefield that is completely
controlled by intelligence and long-range weapons. However, at the same
time the abilities of conventional warfare are decreasing, as pointed out
in the latest report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington. The U.S. is a-maritime world power, and commitments in
the heart of far away continents are neither in their tradition nor in their
national interest.
First and last, it was this skeptical analysis of the strategic
coherence which induced the British in 1998 to extend their
unconditional "NATO first" concept, which traces back to the Second
World War and the beginning of the Cold War. Europeans and
Americans are to become indispensable partners for each other.
However, this requires an equilibrium that so far has never existed.
Because during the Cold War-and since then by no means less-NATO
has been predominantly determined by American leadership, strategy
and technical superiority.
This imbalance, however, is based less on American hegemony
attempts and more on European interests in strategic assistance. In the
time of the Soviet threat the Europeans wanted under no circumstances
to give the signal to the USA that they could master the situation alone if
necessary. Since that time, the Europeans-France and the United
Kingdom represent an exception-have comfortably installed themselves
underneath this protective shield. Insufficient defense budgets, outdated
equipment and old-fashioned armed forces structures have resulted from
this situation.
However, in the past also the Americans were not by any means
unconditionally in favor of a strong "European pillar". On the other
hand, President John F. Kennedy had already required this four decades
ago. Henry Kissinger wanted something similar in the "year of Europe"
in 1973. Washington looked for strategic and material discharge. The
motive was "burden sharing," or load distribution.
For the British government, the ESDI was not by any means only
dictated by security interests. As Great Britain will still stay away for a
couple of years from the core project of Europe, the common currency, it
was in the British interest to demonstrate and bring in the country's
strengths. The European partners spotted for their part the chance to use
the pragmatic British concept of the ESDI to overcome the interwoven
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disorder of the institutions, the incongruence of NATO and the European
Union, the European Union and WEU.
The ESDI will demand from both sides, Europeans and
Americans, to make the effort that Lord Robertson has described: to ride
two horses at the same time. This contradicts the laws of physics;
however, not those of statesmanship. 64
64 See M. Sttirmer, ESDI ist ein Balanceaktfir Europiler und Amerikaner, at
http://www.welt.de/daten/2000/O2/05/O205au15O577.htx.
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